Identity
In the QRI memeplex, identity usually refers to the question of which moments of consciousness are subjectively continuous. A simpler way to put it is that it's about who experiences any one moment of consciousness, though this phrasing implies the existence of an experiencer, which can itself be questioned. Identity only poses a coherent question under a realist view of consciousness.
For example, suppose Anna lived to be 80 years old but had a surgery at 60 that impacted her brain enough to significantly alter her personality. In this case, one could make either of the following two mutually contradictory claims about her identity:
- "Anna died at 60, and someone else experienced the last 20 years of her life"
- "All moments of consciousness exhibited by Anna across her life are subjectively continuous"
Note that two people might hold these opinions without any disagreement about underlying neurological, biological, or physical facts.
Formally, identity is an equivalence relation over the set of all moments of consciousness that divides them into non-overlapping groups. The claims in the example assert that the consciousness exhibited by Anna across her life falls into 2 groups (first claim) or 1 group (second claim).
Identity as discussed in this article is unrelated to social identity, which is about a person's concept of themselves.
Theories of Identity
There are three commonly discussed theories of identity, known as Closed-, Empty-, and Open Individualism. They will be abbreviated as CI, EI, and OI throughout this article.
- CI (Closed Individualism) asserts that each moment of consciousness exhibited by any one person or animal is continuous with other moments exhibited by the same person or animal but discontinuous with moments exhibited by anyone else. Closed Individualism is not well-defined in many edge cases, including cloning, quantum copies, and brain modifications. The two example statements from the introduction are both flavors of Closed Individualism.
- EI (Empty Individualism) asserts that no moment of consciousness is subjectively continuous with any other moment.
- OI (Open Individualism) asserts that every moment of consciousness is subjectively continuous with every other moment.
CI is the socially dominant view. In most discussions around ethics, it is taken as a (usually unacknowledged) background assumption.
The Case Against Closed Individualism
Despite its widespread acceptance, QRI considers CI to be by far the least probable theory. This section will explain the reasons for this position.
The Lack of Evidence
The most apparent starting point for CI's plausibility is that it is highly intuitive, and one may reasonably assume that this provides at least some positive evidence. However, all three theories make identical predictions about what physically happens in the world. Thus, unless one asserts that intuition can operate outside the bounds of physics, it is not possible for evolutionary intuition to distinguish between different theories of identity.
A different way to put this is that one can differentiate between plausibility (i.e., whether a theory is a priori likely) and evidence (i.e., whether a theory predicts the correct empirical facts). Since all three theories make identical physical predictions, one has to decide between them entirely based on their plausibility. In particular, the way experience feels like is an empirical fact that is equally predicted by all the theories, so it cannot provide evidence to distinguish between them.
In addition to identity as discussed in this article (sometimes called "ontological identity"), there's a related concept called phenomenal identity, which is what being a human feels like. Our phenomenal identity generally is that of a continuous subject, i.e., one of CI. Thus, to summarize this section, we can say that our felt sense is entirely about (in fact, synonymous with) our phenomenal identity but provides no evidence for our ontological identity.
The Identity Carrier
A prominent issue with CI is that it requires an identity carrier, i.e., a thing in the brain that the universe can use to identify which moments of consciousness are subjectively continuous. Various conceptions of a soul such as the ones taught by traditional Christianity would make an excellent identity carrier, but identifying one in the physical world is significantly harder. The most plausible candidate might be cells in the cerebral cortex, which (unlike most cells in the body) don't have a turnover rate and can last a lifetime. Even in the cortex, however, there is usually a small amount of cell death. Moreover, it is questionable whether cells are the right level of abstraction, and a physical identity carrier would likely be even more difficult to identify at the level of particles.
The identity carrier can also be used to construct thought experiments that pose difficulties for CI. For example, cloning a person seems to necessitate that the original is subjectively continuous with both copies since the identity carrier would be cloned as well. If so, one could further postulate that the clone is imperfect and some number of particles have changed. If the question of subjective continuity has a binary answer, and if a perfect clone is subjectively continuous with the original, then there must be a particular number such that with changed particles, the clone is subjectively continuous, but with it is not, implying that subjective continuity comes down to a single particle. Many other thought experiments deriving similar conclusions are possible.
Note that no identity carrier is required for EI and OI.
Complexity
A final point against CI is it's Kolmogorov Complexity (the formalization of Occam's Razor). While the precise complexity of any theory is difficult to quantify, it is clear that CI is more complex than EI and OI. In fact, given the vast number of equivalence relations over a given set, one could reasonably argue that CI is no more likely than any number of unnamed theories. In the absence of positive evidence for CI, it should thus be considered less probable than EI and OI, which correspond to the two simplest equivalence relations for any set. (They are known as the identity- or diagonal relation, and the universal- or trivial relation, respectively.)
Empty vs. Open Individualism
While the refutation of CI may be considered an open-and-shut case, the choice between EI and OI is much more difficult since both theories are simple, physically plausible, and unambiguous across all contexts. Moreover, it is not clear that further insights into consciousness would help settle the question.
Given the electromagnetic hypothesis, one way to phrase the question is whether the topological boundaries of the electromagnetic field are epistemic and ontological (EI) or epistemic only (OI). One could hold that the universe's unitary subject of experience is the entire electromagnetic field, in which case segmentation yields epistemic boundaries only, and OI is true. On the other hand, one could also argue that each pocket is de facto separate from the remaining field and thus should be considered its own ontological entity, in which case EI is true. (That said, note that the EM hypothesis doesn't claim that consciousness is identical to just the electromagnetic field, so this framing may be a simplification.)
Yet another approach is to argue that the simplest possible theory is one that rejects the concept of an experiencer altogether, thus rendering the idea of subjective (dis)continuity logically incoherent. In the equivalence relation setting, this approach corresponds to a rejection of the equivalence relation itself, and consequently, the rejection of any set of groups. Such an approach would arguably favor OI since no groups means no distinctions between moments of consciousness. That said, this line of argument is sufficiently conceptually tricky that one may choose to reject it altogether.
As of today, QRI considers both theories to be at least somewhat plausible.
Psychological Implications
Rejecting CI has the potential for profound positive changes to one's mental health, such as:
- reduced fear of death (especially given OI)
- greater compassion for other people
- the potential for increased altruism or cooperation (see the section on game theory)
Because of this, there is a case to be made that popularizing arguments against CI is a moral good. However, rejecting CI also has downsides:
- A belief in EI may decrease hope and be generally psychologically damaging.
- A belief in OI may induce anxiety about the level of suffering in the world.
- A belief in either EI or OI may come with a reduced sense of agency or with increased loneliness.
Due to our evolutionary wiring, one may argue that the upsides will likely outweigh the downsides, especially for OI. I.e., it is unlikely that anxiety about general suffering rises to the level of anxiety about one's personal death (though note that there currently exists no survey data about this question). If this is true, one could further argue that we've been fortunate that the more philosophically plausible views on identity also tend to be more psychologically healthy; if the opposite were true, the topic would be an info hazard.
Even if rejecting CI is a net positive, however, it may still be suboptimal. Because of this, Andrés has suggested adopting a hybrid view called the Goldilocks Zone of Oneness that combines elements from all three theories (quote from the glossary on QualiaComputing):
Having realized that there are both positive and negative psychological aspects to each of the three views of personal identity discussed (Closed, Empty, Open Individualism), the Goldilocks Zone of Oneness emerges as a conceptual resolution. Open Individualism comes with a solution to the fear of death, but it also can give rise to a sort of cosmic solipsism. Closed Individualism allows you to feel fundamentally special, but also disconnected from the universe and fundamentally misunderstood by others. Empty Individualism is philosophically satisfying, but it may come with a sense of lack of agency and the fear of being a time-slice that is stuck in a negative place. The Goldilocks Zone of Oneness posits that there is a way to transcend classical logic in personal identity, and that the truth incorporates elements of all of the three views at once. In the Goldilocks Zone of Oneness one is simultaneously part of a whole but also not the entirety of it. One can relate with others by having a shared nature, while also being able to love them on their own terms by recognizing their unique identity. This view has yet to be formalized, but in the meantime it may prove to be pragmatically useful for community-building.
Open Individualism and Game Theory
The consequences of holding OI over CI are sometimes analyzed through the lens of game theory. The basic claim is that an Open Individualist might decline an option to gain a small personal advantage if it comes at the cost of a large disadvantage to someone else, and that therefore, OIs have reason to cooperate in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma.
While the idea has merit, its application is not straightforward. In particular, its validity depends critically on the relationship between valence and game-theoretical payouts. Game theory, if narrowly understood as a set of mathematical models and theorems, provides no interpretation for its numbers and hence doesn't specify this relationship. However, given that its results only apply to the world to the extent that payouts predict behavior, the most useful definition of payouts is arguably "whatever the agent values", which is also in line with the language of "utility functions" in the literature. Under this interpretation, there is no inherent link between identity and game theory; identity only matters insofar as the agent's utilities take qualia and valence into account. Since valence may be anywhere between 0 and 100% of what an agent values, the effects of adopting OI over CI may fall anywhere in between nonexistent and a consideration of the other player's utilities equal to one's own. (The latter case is depicted in the top right game.) That said, valence plausibly plays at least some role in most practical situations.
If two OIs care sufficiently about qualia to decline taking a personal advantage at the cost of a larger disadvantage for the other person, one might colloquially say that they cooperate in a prisoner's dilemma. Formally, it is more correct to say that their views on identity affect their payouts and hence the underlying game. Thus, they would still cooperate but do so in a "trivial cooperation game" rather than a prisoner's dilemma. This point is worth emphasizing because there exist decision theories that can cooperate in a formal prisoner's dilemma, i.e., while assigning zero value to the other agent's fate.[1] Such types of cooperation share no similarity with cooperation due to views on identity, so it's prudent to keep them separate. It's also worth noting that the trivial cooperation game is ubiquitous in real life; it is rarely discussed (and not formally named) in game theory only because its analysis is trivial. Thus, one could argue that OI can help sidestep game theory altogether by transforming instances of a formal prisoner's dilemma into the trivial cooperation game. Whenever this happens, it is arguably the best possible result since both players will reliably and robustly choose the globally optimal outcome.
A concern about this type of cooperation is that it is exploitable: a CI can choose to defect without fearing retaliation from an OI, at least in principle (see the bottom game). As of before, the application of this result is more complex than the naive analysis suggests. There are already numerous cases in the real world (that are often described as prisoner's dilemmas) wherein people cooperate routinely. (Any public commodity that people tend to preserve in the absence of oversight is an example.) Moreover, there are already mechanisms (like public policing or social shaming) that help prevent exploitation. Thus, while the game-theoretical exploit presents a genuine concern, it doesn't invalidate the potential for cooperation. Indeed, cooperation due to OI might be considered a natural extension of cooperation due to altruism or social norms that is already ubiquitous in the real world.
Resources
- Open Individualism (Part 1): Introduction – the first video in a 5 part series about Open Individualism by QRI president and co-founder Andrés Gomez Emilsson.
- A new theory of Open Individualism – a blog post by QRI co-founder Michael Edward Johnson.
- r/OpenIndividualism – the Reddit community centered around Open Individualism.
- The True Prisoner's Dilemma – a LessWrong essay by Eliezer Yudkowsky illustrating the point that game-theoretical payouts are are whatever the agent values and need not be tied to valence.
References
- ↑ Yudkowsky, E., & Soares, N. (2018). Functional decision theory: A new theory of instrumental rationality. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.05060